Avoid illegal encrypted DRM content sharing with non-transferable re-encryption by Hui, LCK et al.
Title Avoid illegal encrypted DRM content sharing with non-transferable re-encryption
Author(s) He, Y; Hui, LCK; Yiu, SM
Citation
The IEEE 13th International Conference on Communication
Technology (ICCT 2011), Jinan, China, 25-28 September 2011. In
Proceedings of the 13th ICCT, 2011, p. 703-708
Issued Date 2011
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/152036
Rights International Conference on Communication TechnologyProceedings. Copyright © IEEE.
???
 ___________________________________ 
978-1-61284-307-0/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE  
providers’ beneﬁt. Such DRM technology may have pleased
content providers in the beginning, but with the wide usage
of smart phones, MP3 players, MP4 players and other audio
devices et al., consumers require their purchased valuable
digital content, such as music, books, videos, ring tones to
be also shareable in those devices. However, traditional DRM
techonolies hinder digital items coping and sharing. As a
result, confused or dissatisﬁed customers can cause future
customers to avoid legitimate digital content providers, and
therefore, slows the growth of the digital industry. A recent
survey by INDICARE [2] showed that consumers are willing
to pay a higher price for more usage rights and device
interoperability. From the web users polled, 86% preferred
paying 1 Euro for a song that runs on any device rather than
only 50 cents for a song that runs on only one device.
Many works [3], [7], [8], [10], [12] have been focused on the
DRM content sharing problem. In general, the key solution for
this problem is to translate the DRM content from one format
to other formats accessible by other devices. Some solutions
[3], [7] require a trusted third party to manage content transla-
tion, but these solutions rely too much on the third party. Once
the third party is compromised or lost, anyone can use it to
translate the content. Some researchers [8], [12] proposed to
use proxy re-encryption schemes (PRE) for content sharing.
However, we ﬁnd that all these re-encryption based content
sharing schemes cannot resist to a kind of collusion attack,
which is described in detail in section III.
CONTRIBUTIONS.
We propose a new DRM infrastructure based on non-
transferable proxy re-encryption scheme to tackle the DRM
content sharing problem. More importantly, we provide better
payment control to content sharing for preserving content
provider’s beneﬁt. This new infrastructure inherits advantages
of existing proxy re-encryption (PRE) based DRM infrastruc-
ture, which are
• Minimizing the provider’s trust in the DRM agent during
content and license translation by disallowing it access to
the unprotected content (unless the DRM agent can break
the underlying cryptography).
• Even if a DRM agent is compromised, it will not reveal
the protected content.
Moreover, the new infrastructure can better protect content
providers’ beneﬁt in terms of:
• Even if DRM agent colludes with malicious employees
in DRM technology provider, they would not be able to
conduct illegal DRM content sharing.
• Both content provider and DRM technology provider can
get extra payment from providing DRM content sharing
service, but neither of them can provide such service if
working alone.
In Section 2 we introduce the existing research works and
their disadvantages. In section 3, we brieﬂy review the PRE
scheme on which our scheme is based. Section 4 presents the
system architecture and analysis while Section 5 discusses im-
plementation and reports experimental results. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper and outlines some future work.
II. VULNERABILITIES OF PREVIOUS DRM SCHEMES
Kravita et al. [7] suggested to use an external trusted
party to manage content sharing. However, the external party
will get to know all the security properties of the DRM
technology providers. For privacy and commercial concern,
providers are reluctant to share their security properties with
external party to avoid malicious attack. For example, in 2005,
the digital rights management (DRM) of Apple’s iTunes was
compromised partially due to the fact that an untrusted party
(i.e., the client’s resource) could obtain the plaintext during
a naive decrypt-and-encrypt operation, albeit with symmetric
encryption [6].
SmartPro [3] is a smart card based content protection
system. Smart card (e.g., SIM card) securely stores system
keys and guarantees the integrity of the software using these
keys. The DRM system in a card will keep all private or shared
symmetric keys secret - even from the card’s owner. User
who possesses the cards can access the content. It can also
transfer content from a source domain to one or several other
destination domains. The drawback of such method is that it
relies too much on a hardware token, once the card is lost or
stolen, the user will lose the content.
Nam et al. [10] proposed a method of using a neural format
for content translation to achieve content sharing between
different devices, which means that every DRM system shares
the same security infrastructure. In their scheme, devices
translate content to a neutral format when exporting it and
then convert the received neutral format to their own DRM
format while importing it. However, security of this scheme
relies much on the device, because content translation and
license generation are performed by device. Once the device is
compromised or lost, anyone can use it to translate the content.
A new idea of using a secure proxy re-encryption (PRE)
scheme to achieve secure content sharing is proposed in [8],
[12]. A semi-trusted Domain Interoperability Manager (DIM)
is introduced in these PRE based schemes, such that the
DIM can perform the encrypted content translation. Taban et
al.[12] presented two protocols. The ﬁrst protocol minimized
the provider’s trust in the DIM during content and license
translation by disallowing it access to the unprotected content.
However, this protocol is not ﬂexible because it requires
strong assumptions about the exporting and importing devices
and DRM systems. Thus the second protocol is proposed to
extend the ﬁrst one to a more ﬂexible setting. However, the
semi-trusted DIM can access the content by decrypting the
content directly or decrypting the license to get the access
right indirectly.
Lee et al. [8] allows a content provider to designate a
DRM Agent to perform content translation, and claims to be
able to achieve mutual proﬁtable, which means providers can
request additional fees for providing content sharing services.
However, we ﬁnd this scheme is not secure under a collusion
attack: Malicious employees in DRM technology provider
(also called DRM server in [8]) and DRM Agent can collude to
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make copies of a purchased content accessible to any devices
without letting content provider know, thus an illegal content
sharing could be done bypass content provider. This attack
reduces content providers’ beneﬁt. The attack is described in
detail in section III.
III. AN ATTACK TO LEE’S DRM SYSTEM
In this attack, after getting a re-encryption key to do re-
encryption for only once, the designated DRM Agent (DIA)
and malicious employees in DRM server (DS) can collude
to generate another ”re-encryption key” gπ/μ to decrypt any
interoperable format cipher ICm to get the content encryption
key Km without asking content provider (CP) for a re-
encryption key any more. As a result, DIA and malicious
employees in DS can take CP’s proﬁt by selling the ”re-
encryption key”. For instance, if a consumer wants to have
a purchased DRM protected content m which is stored in DIA
played in another device, under normal circumstances, CP, DS
and DRM Interoperability Server (DIS) cooperate to provide
the content sharing service, and get payment respectively.
However, if the attack succeed, consumer just needs to pay
DIA and DS for a re-encryption key gπ/μ. But CP and DIS do
not know the illegal trading among DIA, DS and consumer.
The detailed attack procedure is like this:
After a successful content sharing, DIA gets hold of a re-
encryption key rkμ→α = g
α/μ. This is a legal re-encryption
key created by DIS, DS and CP. The detailed process of
generating gα/μ can be found in [8]. In order to do an illegal
content sharing bypass CP and DIS, malicious employees in
DS and DIA try to generate an illegal re-encryption key from
this legal re-encryption key. At ﬁrst, DIA computes gαπ/μ from
rkμ→α. Then DIA gives g
απ/μ to DS. DS computes gπ/μ using
its private key α. gπ/μ is the illegal re-encryption key. If DIA
and DS disclose this gπ/μ to any consumer i, i can decrypt
the ICm by computing
ϕ2(Km) = ϕ2(Km)Z
πk1
/
e(gπ/μ, gμk1)
After getting ϕ2(Km), consumer can decrypt m from
SE(Km;m).
Note that this attack is not only successful to Lee’s sys-
tem, but also workable to existing proxy re-encryption based
DRM systems because of the inherent weakness of proxy re-
encryption schemes.
IV. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
A. Proxy Re-encryption
A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme allows a proxy to re-
encrypt a ciphertext for Alice (delegator) to a ciphertext for
Bob (delegatee) without seeing the underlying plaintext. With
the help of the proxy, Alice can delegate the decryption right
to any delegatee. The Non-Transferable PRE scheme used in
this paper were proposed in [4], [5]. We brieﬂy recall Non-
Transferable PRE scheme and some security properties here.
For comprehensive deﬁnitions, please see the full version of
the paper [4], [5]. The scheme is composed of the following
algorithms:
• Setup. On input a security parameter 1k, the public
parameters mpk = (g, g1, h1, h2, h3, HI , H,H
′,M) and
master secret key msk = (α) of PKG are generated. HI ,
H and H ′ are secure hash functions. h1, h2, h3, g ∈ G
and α ∈ Zp. It sets g1 = g
α. Deﬁne the message space
M ∈ GT . We say that GT has an admissible bilinear
map e: G×G → GT .
• Key Generation. User A’s private key is uskA =(rA,
rA,1, hA,1, rA,2, hA,2, rA,3, hA,3), in which rA,
rA,1, rA,2, rA,3 ∈ Zp, hA,1 = (h1g
−rA,1)1/(α−idA),
hA,2=(h2g
−rA,2)1/(α−idA), hA,3=(h3g
−rA,3)1/(α−idA).
Similarly, user B’s private key is denoted as
uskB = (rB , rB,1, hB,1, rB,2, hB,2, rB,3, hB,3). A
publishes her public key upkA=(pA,1, pA,2), where
pA,1=g1
rA , and pA,2=g
rAidA .
• Encryption. The encryption algorithm AE(upk,m)
takes public key upkA of delegator A, a unique
randomly-selected secret parameter s ∈ Zp, and message
m as input, computes the ciphertext C where:
C=(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6) =(pA,1
spA,2
−s, e(g, g)s,
m · e(g, h1)
−s
, e(g, g)H
′(m), gsβ+H
′(m),
e(g, h2)
se(g, h3)
sβ). We set β = H(C1, C2, C3, C4).
• Decryption(delegator). To decrypt a ciphertext C =
(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6) using secret key uskA, delega-
tor Alice computes β = H(C1, C2, C3, C4) and tests
whether
e(C5, g) = C
β
2C4
and
C6 = e(C1, hA,2hA,3
β)1/rA · C2
rA,2+rA,3β
If either of them is not equal, outputs ⊥. Else computes
m = C3 · e (C1, hA,1)
1/rA · C2
rA,1
If e(g, g)H
′(m) = C4 holds, return m; otherwise return
⊥.
• Re-Encryption Key Generation. A generates a random
value ai ∈ Zp, where i ≥ 1. ai will be invalid after a
time period i. A signs B’s identity IDB , and sends the
signature σ, IDB , ai to PKG via a secure channel. PKG
veriﬁes the delegator A’s signature, and extracts delegatee
B’s ID from signature. The re-encryption key generation
algorithm outputs a re-encryption key rkA→B=(
α−idB
α−idA
+
aiy) mod p, where y is a random number chosen by
PKG. B1=
(
h1
rBg−r
′
B
)aiy/(α−idB)
is also computed for
A to generate a Partial-Decryption-Key later.
• Partial-Decryption-Key Generation. A checks the cor-
rectness of the re-encryption key, and generates a partial
decryption key (h′B
1/rA , B1
1/rA ), where h′B is from B.
Then the partial decryption key are sent to B.
• Re-Encryption. Algorithm RE(rk, C) takes re-
encryption key rkA→B and ciphertext C as input, outputs
C1
′ = C1
rkA→B = g
rAs(α−idA)(
α−idB
α−idA
+aiy), and sends
???
the re-encrypted ciphertext C ′= (C1
′, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)
to Bob.
• Decryption(delegatee). The decryption algorithm takes
private key uskB of delegatee B, partial decryp-
tion key and ciphertext C ′ as input, outputs message
m=C3
e(C1
′,h′B
(1/rA)(1/rB))C2
rB,1
e(C1,B1
(1/rA)(1/rB))
.
There are several security properties for proxy re-encryption
scheme, we extract ﬁve important properties which are of great
importance to our DRM content sharing system:
• Non-transferable: In PRE, the proxy and a set of collud-
ing delegatees cannot re-delegate decryption rights. This
is called Non-transferable. For example, from rkA→B ,
skB and pkC , they cannot produce rkA→C .
• Unidirectional: Delegation from A → B does not allow
delegation from B → A.
• Original-access: A can decrypt re-encrypted ciphertexts
that were originally sent to her.
• Collusion-“safe”: B and the proxy’s collusion cannot
recover A’s secret key.
• Non-transitive: Based on the re-encryption keys, rkA→B
and rkB→C , the proxy cannot produce rkA→C .
V. OUR DRM SYSTEM TC-DRM
In this section we present the Traceable and Controllable
DRM Content Sharing system (TC-DRM) architecture which
is shown in ﬁgure 2. The system consists of four main
components: Content Provider, DRM Technology Provider,
DRM Agent and Device.
Content Provider(CP): Content provider is an organization
or individual that creates information, educational or enter-
tainment content, and publishes them in a secure form. It
coordinates the whole DRM content sharing processes. When
two different parties agree to allow content sharing, CP is
responsible for collecting information from the those parties
and deriving a re-encryption key to DRM Agent.
DRM Technology Provider(DP): The DRM technology
provider provides technologies to control use of digital media
by preventing access, copying or conversion to other formats
by illegal end users.
DRM Agent(DA): DRM agent requests a re-encryption
key from CP, and translates encrypted contents accessible by
device a to encrypted contents accessible by device b.
Device(D): Device has stored the public/private key of itself,
as well as the public key that a device must trust: for example,
the public key of DP.
We assume that the exporting device DA and importing
device DB render similar content format and the exporting and
importing DRM systems use similar encryption algorithms.
The assumptions are reasonable, because most if not all
portable music players play the MP3 formats, and most DRM
systems, such as Fairplay and Windows Media DRM, use the
AES encryption algorithm to encrypt their contents.
Table 1 deﬁnes the notations we use to describe the pro-
posed system.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
M Plaintext of protected content
C Ciphertext
C’ Re-encrypted Ciphertext
k Content encryption key
usk Private key
upk Public key
S(usk,m) Sign on message m with private key usk
σ Signature
Ek(·) Symmetric encryption with key k
AE(upk,m) Asymmetric encryption on information m with public
key upk
rka→b Re-encryption key used to re-encrypt a message
encrypted under upk of entity a to one under upk
of entity b
RE(rk, C) Re-encryption on information C using key rk
In our TC-DRM system, a DRM content shareable protocol
consists of three phases: Initialization Phase, Content Usage
Phase, and Content Sharing Phase.
Initialization Phase When DRM Technology Provider
DPA agrees on a contract that its protected content can
be played in device b (Db) protected by DRM Technology
Provider DPB , DPB should make some of Db’s private
information h′b usable to DPA. This action would not reveal
Db’s private key. Further, DPA chooses a random value
ai ∈ Zp and sends it to CP for generating re-encryption key
in content sharing phase.
Content Usage Phase
1) Consumer purchases an encrypted digital content
Ek(M), C = AE(upkDa , k) from CP and stores it in
its DA.
2) Da decrypts C to get k with its private key. Then with
k, Da can decrypt Ek(M) to access the content M. Note
that Da is just able to use k for decrypting Ek(M) in
the device, but unable to leak k outside.
Content Sharing Phase
1) When consumer wishes to play the content in his another
device Db which is manufactured under DPB’s DRM
standard, consumer sends a request along with Db and
its server DPB’s information to DA.
2) DA sends a content sharing request to DPA with identity
information of Db and DPB .
3) DPA signs Db’s identity IDb as S(uskDPA , IDb). Then
DPA sends the signature σ, IDb to CP via a secure
channel to request for a re-encryption key rka→b.
4) CP extracts Db’s ID from signature, and veriﬁes DPA’s
signature. If veriﬁcation passes, CP generates a unique
randomly-selected secret parameter y ∈ Zp, and outputs
a re-encryption key rka→b=(
α−ida
α−idb
+ aiy) mod p and
B1=
(
h1
rbg−r
′
b
)aiy/(α−idb)
. CP sends rka→b to DA
and B1 to DPA.
5) DA re-encrypts C, and sends re-encrypted data C ′ =
RE(rka→b, C) to Db.
6) DPA generates h
′
b
1/ra and B1
1/ra , sends them to Db as
the license.
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Consumer b
DRM Technology Provider A
Device Information Repository
DRM Agent
Re-encryption key Repository
Consumer a
Private key memory
License Handler
License Issuer
Content Provider
Encrypted Content Storage
Re-encryption Handler
Re-encryption key Generator DRM Technology Provider B
Device Information Repository
License Issuer
License Handler
Private key memory
Partial Decryption Key 
Generator
Partial Decryption Key 
Generator
Partial Decryption Key related 
Info Generator
Fig. 2. System Architecture
7) Db uses its private key and license to decrypt C
′ to get
k. Then decrypts Ek(M) to access the content.
A. Payment Scenario
The payment scenario is divided into two parts, one
part is the content purchase payment, the other one is
content sharing payment. The content purchase payment
should be paid to CP by consumer when buying the
content from CP. To encourage CP and DP to participate
in the content sharing, we have to ensure that this
scheme would bring beneﬁt to them. Thus content shar-
ing payment should be done when consumer requests
content sharing service. After received the payment from
consumer, CP gives the re-encryption key to DA, and
DPA sends the license to Db.
B. Analysis
This DRM content sharing infrastructure can provide se-
cure content sharing among different devices of the same
DP, as well as among different devices of two different
DPs. This system can achieve three important properties
that previous re-encryption based DRM schemes cannot
achieve.
• Controllable: The re-encryption generation must
involve CP’s participation. Without CP, no one can
share content with others. Further, the license is
generated by DPA. Without DPA, Db is unable to
access the content. Thus both CP and DPA control
the content sharing together.
• Non-transferable: This property cannot be achieved
in paper [12], [8], but successfully solved in our
scheme. DA and DPA cannot collude to generate
another ”re-encryption key” without asking content
provider. The detailed analysis and proof can be
found in [4].
• Traceable: Paper [8] claimed that they can track the
translation of DRM content because CP is involved
to generate a re-encryption key, so that CP can
trace translation of its content. But in the attack
described in section III of our paper, we show
that malicious employees in DP can collude with
DIA to generate ”re-encryption” key for translating
content without CP. Thus paper [8] cannot achieve
traceable property as they claimed. In this paper,
non-transferable property ensures that if without
CP, DA and DP would be unable to generate a valid
re-encryption key. Thus CP can always trace the
content.
Due to the properties of non-transferable re-encryption
scheme, the proposed DRM content sharing system can
achieve four important security properties:
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• Unidirectional: Encrypted content can be shared
from Da to Db, does not mean that it can also be
shared from Db to Da with the same re-encryption
key.
• Original-access: Da can decrypt re-encrypted con-
tent that were originally bought by it.
• Collusion-“safe”: DA and DPA cannot collude to
recover CP’s private key.
• Non-transitive: Encrypted content can be shared
from Da to Db, and from Db to Dc respectively,
which does not mean that it can also be shared from
Da to Dc.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
The efﬁciency of DRM system using non-transferable re-
encryption scheme can be measured by referring to the data in
[4]. Here we focus on comparing Lee’s scheme [8] with ours.
However, Lee [8]’s system uses the MIRACL cryptographic
library [11] with 160-bit group, and our system uses PBC
library [9] with 512-bit size for order of the base ﬁeld. Thus
various choices, such as parameter sizes and encryption gran-
ularity can greatly affect the efﬁciency of the scheme. To have
a more accurate comparison result of scheme efﬁciency, we re-
implement Lee’s DPRE scheme using PBC library. The result
shows that DPRE takes 51.27ms for encryption, and 29.72ms
for re-encryption. When compared with our scheme (27.1ms
for encryption and 12.6ms for re-encryption), our scheme is
more efﬁcient than DPRE. This is quite a signiﬁcant reduction
especially when the DA has to handle a large number of re-
encryption requests. This shows that our system is efﬁcient.
More details can be found in [4].
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have proposed an approach to avoid ille-
gal DRM content sharing with non-transferable re-encryption
scheme. The billing method for content sharing improves the
preservation of content provider’s beneﬁt. The whole system
is efﬁcient and practical.
We plan to extend this work by including a mobile phone
as a semi-trusted third party. As a private belonging, mobile
phone can be relied upon to do certain things for DRM
purpose, such as acting as DA for re-encryption, and be
responsible for managing payment to CP for each content
sharing event.
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